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AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Robert C. Wigton*
INTRODUCTION
American political parties have always occupied a gray area of
constitutional law because of their dual public-private nature.' At
times, political parties undertake activities that make them look
very much like parts of the government. At other times they behave
more like private organizations. The courts have long recognized
the dual nature of political parties in this country but have never
provided a coherent framework to distinguish when parties are to
be treated as "public" entities and when they are to be deemed
"private" ones. When parties are treated as primarily public entities,
they are often subjected to the same constitutional standards that
the courts have traditionally imposed on the "State." When parties
are seen as undertaking "private" activities, they have often been
afforded greater freedom in their actions. As the role of political
parties has grown over the years, this question has become
increasingly difficult to answer.
This Article will attempt to offer a partial resolution of this
public-private entity problem in American constitutional law. My
framework represents an explicit effort to find a compromise
between two sets of competing political values in this area. To
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Eckerd College; J.D., Ph.D., State
University of New York at Buffalo. The author would like to express his special
thanks to William C. Robinson, Class of 2000, Stetson University College of
Law, for reading and commenting on the manuscript.
1 Not present in the Constitution nor at the founding, political parties were
the subject of much early derision and suspicion. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10,
47, 48 (James Madison); George Washington's Farewell Address, reprinted in
GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 512-27 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988).
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date, there has been only limited and periodic discussion of this
dilemma in Supreme Court opinions and even less discussion by
lower federal courts. Thus, while it is clear that the courts
recognize this problem, there has been no serious effort to resolve
it through the development of a coherent set of guidelines. This
Article fills this void by setting forth a more complete set of
review guidelines that build upon past judicial consideration of
these issues, while reconciling the opposing political ideals inherent
in this area. In proposing this new set of review standards for
legislation impacting parties, I am assuming to some degree the
desirability of maintaining the present two-party system. Of course,
the viability and desirability of American political parties have
been hotly debated issues for some time.2
Because the Constitution does not mention political parties, they
developed outside the law in the early decades of the Republic.3
Most of the major developments in the history of our political
parties took place with little, if any, judicial involvement. Thus, the
emergence of our two modem political parties, national nominating
conventions, and the establishment of national committees all took
place without significant judicial participation. Political parties were
unregulated private entities until the states began legislating
reforms in the 1860s. The earliest state legislation dealt with such
internal party matters as qualifications for membership, notice
requirements for meetings, and bans on bribery at party caucuses.4
2 See, e.g., JOHN J. COLEMAN, PARTY DECLINE IN AMERICA: POLICY,
POLITICS, AND THE FISCAL STATE (1996); WILLIAM CROTTY, AMERICAN PARTIES
IN DECLINE (2d ed. 1984); XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR., THE PARTY
GOES ON: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE Two-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES (1985); L. SANDY MAISEL, THE PARTIES RESPOND (2d ed. 1990); KELLY
D. PATTERSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1996); MARTIN P. WATrENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES 1952-1988 (1990). See also JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY
PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
AMERICA 14-17 (1995) (discussing whether the strength of political parties has
increased since the 1960s).
' See generally WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, POLITICAL PARTIES IN A NEW
NATION (1963); AUSTIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY
REFORM IN AMERICA 58-100 (1975).
4 CHARLES E. MERRIAM, PRIMARY ELECTIONS 9-17 (1908); RANNEY, supra
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as parties became
more visible in American politics through the operation of
primaries, urban machines, and political advertising, there were
greater calls for their regulation. This regulation most often took
the form of state legislation aimed at "reforming" party behavior.5
As more states began adopting the Australian ballot at the turn of
the century, parties gradually came to be regarded as partly
"public" entities. This trend toward state regulation of parties
continued as the states began legislating on matters of internal
party governance. With the adoption of the direct primary by many
states in the early 1900s, state legislative control expanded in both
scope and variety. Today most states regulate both the internal
mechanisms and electoral behavior of parties operating within their
borders.6
The growth of state laws regulating political parties provided
many avenues for potential judicial involvement in party affairs.
State efforts to control internal party committee composition and
structure raised important and difficult questions of First Amend-
ment free association rights. Moreover, state regulation of parties'
electoral behavior implicate the fundamental constitutional rights
of voting and participation in politics.
I. THE COMPETING VALUES
While not formally one of the national political institutions,
political parties today are nonetheless major players in both
national and state politics. They have long provided what may be
considered quasi-governmental services, including candidate
note 3, at 79-81. See also PAuL ALLEN BECK, PARTY POLrTCs IN AMERICA 66-
72 (8th ed. 1997) (providing the range of modem state regulation of political
parties).
5 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 3-22 (1955).
6 BECK, supra note 4, at 66-72; Timothy Conlan et al., State Parties in the
1980s, 10 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (1984). National legislation
regulating political parties did not appear until the enactment of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)), amended by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1994)).
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recruitment, the operation of political campaigns, and the supervi-
sion of the voting process. As with the federal bureaucracy,
political parties are important extra-constitutional political institu-
tions that have been essentially grafted onto our separation of
powers system.7 The ambiguity surrounding the proper institutional
role that parties should conceptually play in American politics has
posed vexing problems for the courts in balancing party indepen-
dence with government supervision.
In order to ascertain the role that political parties should play
within our political system, it is useful to see them as informal
parts of the larger system of separation of powers.8 If parties are
seen as part of this larger system, then it follows that they are
entitled to a certain amount of judicial protection to ensure their
integrity and independence. Under this interpretation, the courts
should bear some responsibility for preserving the separateness of
political parties in the same way as the judiciary ensures that the
powers of the formal branches of the government do not unduly
infringe upon one another. If parties are seen as performing some
governmental functions, then it follows that they should be entitled
to some independence in the conduct of these functions. If parties
are to check government power, then some of their activities must
lie beyond direct government control.
The level of independence granted to parties should vary
depending on the type of party activity under consideration. In its
more "private" functions, such as selection of party leaders, the
7 LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 340-42
(1967). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-
18, at 1076-80 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the competing interests of democratic
theory in state regulation of parties).
8 Theodore J. Lowi, Party, Policy, and the Constitution in America, in THE
AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 238-76 (2d ed. 1975). Lowi discusses the
contribution of party development in the United States to the revival of the
separation of powers from about the time of Andrew Jackson, which gave him
and succeeding presidents a power base independent of the Congress. Id. at 246-
48. Thus, parties can be seen as a part of the larger separation of powers system,
or they can be seen through their activities as contributors to the reinforcement
of the formal separation of powers among the national political institutions. Id.
at 253-54. In either case, party independence is an important component in the
preservation of the separation of powers.
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parties should retain maximum independence from government
regulation, including judicial oversight. When parties perform their
more "public" functions, such as the operation of election cam-
paigns and actual governance, they should be subject to much
closer judicial scrutiny and held to higher constitutional standards.
In this way, the states and courts will be able to foster the demo-
cratic ideals of electoral competitiveness and participation while
preserving some degree of party independence. The goal is a
balance between these two sets of fundamental American political
ideals.
In conceptualizing parties within our separation of powers
system, they can be compared most closely with the independence
that we afford to the courts themselves. Judicial independence has
long been regarded as one of the strengths of our democratic
system by providing an independent force to adjudge the behavior
of the more overtly political parts of the government. Similarly,
political parties can be seen as checks on the power of government
through their independent influence over various phases of the
electoral and governing processes.
Another way to conceive of the role of parties within our
political system is to consider them as an independent, non-
governmental force such as the mass media. Like the press,
political parties perform a sort of independent analysis and critique
of government officials and their policies. It can be argued that, as
we cherish an independent and vigorous press, so too should we
value independent political parties. A guarantee of party indepen-
dence ensures that the incumbent regime cannot control fully the
nomination and electoral processes. The preservation of vigorous
and independent parties also buttresses the likelihood that there will
be some organized opposition to any incumbent government.
Portions of the foregoing theoretical considerations have
occasionally appeared in both Supreme Court opinions and those
of lower federal courts. These considerations have provided some
theoretical moorings for judges attempting to interpret when and
how statutory and constitutional doctrines should apply to parties
in this country. Thus, when the courts have been confronted with
various state legislative attempts to regulate political parties, they
have frequently considered the broader theoretical role(s) that
parties play in our political system. Similar considerations have
415
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arisen when the courts have considered the application of various
constitutional doctrines to parties and their activities.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILING PARTY INDEPENDENCE
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS
In the 1960s, two leading students of American political parties
conceptualized our parties as being composed of three parts: the
"party organization" encompassing the party's active members; the
"party-in-the-electorate" composed of the party's rank-and-file
membership; and the "party-in-government" made up of the party's
elected and appointed officeholders. 9
It is possible to organize past federal court opinions dealing
with political parties into three classes paralleling this trichotomy.
The first includes those decisions which have dealt with what is
arguably the most "private" side of party behavior: party decisions
as to membership, internal party structure, and selection of party
leaders. These are matters which primarily concern party activists
and are vital to the preservation of party independence.
A second set of federal court opinions has dealt with the
conduct of political parties in elections. This set represents the
largest number of cases and involves judicial interpretation of a
wide range of state laws regulating various aspects of the electoral
process. The study of these cases is useful because they provide a
glimpse into how much state regulation of parties is permissible in
the name of the public interest. Here, as in other areas dealing with
political parties, the courts have often been forced to consider the
virtues of maintaining independent political parties while simulta-
neously subjecting them to some degree of public supervision when
they perform important governmental functions.'0
9 V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROuPs 211-12 (5th ed.
1964); FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 197 (1968). See also
ALDRICH, supra note 2, at 7, 12-14.
10 In most instances, these cases construe state laws that were ostensibly
enacted to further some public policy in the electoral realm. However, since
political parties are often major players in the enactment of such legislation,
these state regulations are often highly politicized efforts by one or both parties
in a state to gain some electoral advantage over each other or over third parties
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A third set of court opinions deal with political parties while
"in-government." Of course, American political parties never match
their European counterparts in their ability to move into govern-
ment and rule, but the winners in most American elections are
nonetheless partisans who frequently attempt to execute policies
favorable to their own party from their position as public
office-holders. The major area of judicial concern here has been
with political party patronage, where the victorious party attempts
to seize government jobs, contracts, and other benefits for its
members. As office-holders and governors, parties are clearly
performing "public" functions and should be subject to consider-
ably higher regulatory and constitutional standards of behavior.
The advantage of this trichotomy of federal court opinions is
that it helps reorganize past court decisions in conjunction with the
policy reasons for treating parties differently on the basis of the
activity they are undertaking. Thus the greatest governmental
regulation, and judicial scrutiny, is reserved for those party
functions which are the most "public" in nature. This scheme also
provides a clearer boundary delimiting those party activities that
are essential to the continued independence of parties.
III. EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The emerging constitutional standards in this area have grown
out of a tension between the two polar positions on the issue of
state regulation of political parties.11 On the one hand, political
parties have traditionally contended that they are "voluntary
organizations" entitled to virtually absolute First Amendment
protection in the exercise of their rights of free association and free
expression. The typical counter-argument of the states seeking to
regulate their parties is that they are public entities which must be
regulated in the public interest. Some of the typical "public
interests" asserted by the states in these cases include a desire to
ensure that the parties' internal governance processes are
and independent candidates.
" See, e.g., San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 792 F.2d
802, 804-07 (9th Cir. 1986), affd, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
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democratic, to avoid voter confusion, to ensure party committees
are broadly representative, to foster internal party "harmony," and
generally to protect the integrity of the electoral process.
12
Both federal and state courts have struggled to find the best
way to apply First Amendment freedoms to these situations. In
some cases, it appears that there are two competing sets of free
association rights. Party insiders, or "activists," usually claim their
right to associate (or not to associate) freely for political purposes
with whom they choose. Those persons outside the party, or its
governance structure, frequently assert a need to associate with an
established political party as one of the few avenues to genuine
political participation at the state and local levels.
In the period before the enactment of comprehensive state
legislative schemes regulating political parties, most judges tended
to view internal party disputes as involving "political" as opposed
to "legal" rights and usually refused to find jurisdiction. 3
Throughout the nineteenth century the Supreme Court stayed clear
of most electoral disputes through invocation of the political
question doctrine. 14 When the states first began regulating parties
in the late nineteenth century with the introduction of the direct
primary, the courts were generally reluctant to become involved. At
the turn of the century, as the states began to enact regulatory
schemes, the courts were more likely to find jurisdiction and
consider the merits of these claims.15 Many early courts took the
traditional position that the parties were indeed like political clubs
and beyond state regulation. In its 1935 decision in Grovey v.
12 Id. at 814.
13 See, e.g., People ex rel. Eaton v. District Court., 31 P. 339 (Colo. 1892);
Stephenson v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 76 N.W. 914 (Mich. 1898); People
ex rel. Simpson v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 31 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1894). See
also RANNEY, supra note 3, at 78-82 (discussing the growth of state regulation
in this area); Annotation, Determination of Controversies Within Political Party,
20 A.L.R. 1035, 1036-41 (1922).
14 See, e.g., Kies v. Lowery, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); Forsyth v.
Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162, 175 (1874).
15 See, e.g., Baker v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 68 N.W. 752 (Mich.
1896); In re Woodworth, 16 N.Y.S. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1891); State ex rel. Cook v.
Houser, 100 N.W. 964 (Wisc. 1904).
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Townsend,16 the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of blacks
from a party primary, despite a state law, finding that political
parties were "voluntary political association[s]," which "arise from
the exercise of the free will and liberty of the citizens composing
them.""7 This decision marked a brief high-water mark in the
Court's refusal to apply the First Amendment freedoms to the
activities of political parties. Nine years later, the Court struck
down the Texas White Primary in the landmark decision Smith v.
Allwright.8
Reform efforts in the states to purify politics and political
parties soon spread beyond the direct primary. By the 1920s most
states had at least begun the process of enacting complex and
detailed statutory guidelines for their political, parties. These
guidelines included specification of the size, composition, responsi-
bilities, and even the meeting times and places for state and local
party conmmittees. 19 In 1958, the incorporation of freedom of
association into the Fourteenth Amendment provided the federal
courts with a new tool to adjudicate state laws affecting political
parties. 20 As the volume of cases increased in the 1970s, the
Supreme Court held in Storer v. Brown that states would' be
required to show a "compelling interest" before burdening the First
Amendment rights of political parties or their members. E1
In recent years, federal case law has been a confused jumble of
ad hoc decisions as the courts struggled with a wide range of
circumstances and statutory schemes. There have been many
instances where federal courts have upheld various state efforts to
regulate political parties.22 Similarly, there have been many
16 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
17 Id. at 52 (citing Bell v. Hill, 74 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1934)).
18 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
19 RANNEY, supra note 3, at 18.
20 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
21 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974).
22 See, e.g., Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 199 (1979) (upholding a
state law requiring a party's state committees to have two representatives from
each county); Storer, 415 U.S. at 735-36 (finding valid as a compelling
governmental interest, California's "sore loser" provision, which required that to
run as an independent candidate one must be non-affiliated with a party for one
year); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (upholding New York's
419
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instances where the courts have invalidated state efforts to regulate
party structure or behavior.23 The courts have offered very little
unified guidance for reconciling these decisions. In the 1980s, the
courts continued to expand First Amendment freedoms while the
states increased their regulatory efforts. This situation created
something of a collision. 24 There appears to be no obvious logic
by which these cases spanning the last two decades can be
reconciled. The variety of statutes involved, and range of possible
delayed enrollment scheme barring voters from participating in a primary election
unless registered with the party prior to last general election); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (upholding a Georgia statute requiring candidates who
failed to win a party nomination to collect signatures of five percent of voters to
get on ballot); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)
(recognizing that a state has a legitimate interest in upholding the integrity of the
electoral process, including the preservation of identifiable interest groups).
23 Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
187 (1979) (stating that an Illinois law requiring 25,000 signatures for new
parties and independents violated the Equal Protection Clause); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 495 (1975) (concluding that a state interest in controlling
the seating of state delegates to national party convention was not compelling);
Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (striking Florida's
statutory ban on pre-primary endorsements by party leaders as a substantial
burden on First Amendment rights).
24 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214 (1989) (declaring the California election code's provisions barring
endorsement of primary candidates by a party's governing body to be a violation
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as an infringement on the party's
freedom of association); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208
(1986) (holding Connecticut's closed primary statute unconstitutional as violative
of a political party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by restricting the
party's political association with other candidates); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780 (1983) (holding an Ohio statute unconstitutional that required
independent candidates for the presidency to submit a statement of candidacy and
nominating petition in March to qualify for a general election petition ballot in
November); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87
(1982) (invalidating on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds an Ohio statute
that required minor political parties to disclose their contributors and each
recipient of disbursed funds); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (upholding Wisconsin's open primary law
because the state had a substantial interest in how elections are conducted and
stating that the National Democratic Party delegates are not required under party
rules to vote in accordance with the Wisconsin open primary).
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state interests implicated, has made it highly unlikely that the
courts will be able to distill any firm rules of law in this area.
The trichotomy described above can help to bring some order
to these precedents as well as provide a firmer theoretical basis for
treating various state regulatory schemes differently. If state laws
can be categorized on the basis of what aspect of party behavior
they regulate, then the courts can deliver more uniform, and more
theoretically defensible, decisions in the application of First
Amendment freedoms to political parties.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND "INTERNAL" PARTY
ACTIVITIES
This Part refines and expands the constitutional standards that
courts should apply in cases involving matters "internal" to
political parties. z5 It is in the conduct of their own affairs that
political parties are best able to assert their rights of free associa-
tion and thus claim a broad exemption from government regula-
tion."
The central problem is how to maximize party independence in
internal matters without sacrificing other key political ideals, such
as broad participation in these vital political organizations. It is
quite difficult to identify precisely which party functions are
"internal." This dilemma can be solved in part by delimiting the
range of "internal" party activities as narrowly and specifically as
possible. In this Article, this term refers to the selection and
composition of party leadership, decisions relating to party structure
and party membership, and national delegate selection. Any party
activities relating to the conduct of elections, either primary or
general, will not be considered "internal" matters.27 Such a
25 Modern judges have usually used the term "internal" to denote those party
functions least susceptible to state regulation. However, some judges have
labelled this set of functions "political."
26 See Virginia E. Sloan, Judicial Intervention in Political Party Disputes,
22 UCLA L. REV. 622 (1975) (providing an overview of the judicial role in this
area).
27 But elections of party executive committee members and other internal
party officials will be considered "internal" even if these elections are sometimes
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
definition reduces the possibility of giving any judicial protection
to partisan actions aimed at excluding individuals on other than
ideological grounds.
Government regulation of "internal" party matters has arisen in
a limited number of circumstances. The most common scenario has
been where a political party has sought to exclude certain persons,
or groups of persons, from participating in party governance
committees or leadership positions. In other cases, this issue has
been presented through challenges to state legislation that attempt
to regulate some aspect of internal party structure or operations.28
There is also a second- set of cases that have dealt with those
situations when a state regulatory law has conflicted with a
national party rule.29 A third general situation in this area arises
when party organs or leaders seek to endorse one candidate in the
party primary. Each of these scenarios has produced case law
which can form the base or starting point for the development of
more complete judicial standards.
A. Regulation of Parties' Internal Structure and Leadership
Since the early years of this century, the states have resorted to
a wide range of statutory schemes to control the structure and
behavior of their state party organizations and leaders.3 ° While
denoted as "primaries."
28 See, e.g., Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979) (holding that a
Washington statute requiring each major political party to have a state committee
consisting of two persons from each county was not violative of party members'
freedom of association).
29 See, e.g., LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 126 (holding that members of National
Democratic Party were not bound by Wisconsin's state primary election results,
which were reached in a manner contrary to National Party rules); O'Brien v.
Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (concluding that
an Alabama statute authorizing the Democratic National Party to choose its
nominees for elector in a party primary and to fix candidate qualifications was
constitutional).
30 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 5000-8944 (West 1996) (providing rules
for the creation and organization of political parties, voting and elections); FLA.
STAT. ch. 103 (1998) (providing guidelines for the regulation of presidential
electors, political parties, executive committees and members); N.Y. ELEC. LAW
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varying in the degree of flexibility accorded to their parties, these
statutory schemes typically mandate a federated layering of party
committees, culminating in a state party committee.31 Many states
also regulate such party matters as the size of the party commit-
tees, 32  gender representation on party committees, 33  the
Art. 2 (McKinney 1998) (providing guidelines for the creation and organization
of state and county committees and for election nominations, voting and
fundraising). See also BECK, supra note 4, at 66-72.
31 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7150-7882 (West 1996) (providing
guidelines for the creation of state and local committees); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.091 (West 1998) (providing rules for the creation of state and county
executive committees); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 2-102, 2-104 (McKinney 1998)
(providing rules for the creation of state committees and guidance for the
creation of county committees).
32 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7150 (setting forth the membership of the
state central committee); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7200 (providing an election
procedure for county committees in counties with fewer than five assembly
districts); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7201 (establishing membership and voter
qualifications for Democratic Party, for counties of the fifth class, to include
central committee election by assembly districts and by consent of six members
from each elected assembly who have status as a county resident); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 7202 (stating that counties containing more than four or less then twenty
assembly districts shall elect a county central committee from assembly districts
consisting of six members elected from each assembly district); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 7203 (establishing composition of county central committees in counties
containing more than twenty assembly districts); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7204
(providing for twelve members in city and county central committees elected
from assembly districts 12 and 13); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7205 (stating qualifica-
tions for district representation including, but not limited to, residency
requirements, and reapportionment of central county committee every ten years);
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7400, 7401, 7402 (providing rules for counties with less
than five assembly districts, for counties with five to nineteen assembly districts,
for counties with twenty or more assembly districts); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.09 1(1) (providing that each political party of the state shall be represented
by a state executive committee and providing rules for such committee); N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 2-102 (providing rules for the creation of the state committees);
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-104 (providing rules for the creation of county committees).
31 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7156, 7157(b) (providing gender
representation requirements for membership in committees); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.091(1) (stating that each county executive committee shall consist of at
least two members, a man and a woman, from each precinct); N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§§ 2-102(4), 2-104(2) (providing that the committee, state or local, may provide
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frequency of committee elections and meetings, 34 the rules
governing party comniittees, 5 the removal and replacement of
committee members,36 the selection of state party delegates to
national conventions, 37 and party finances.38
Given this panoply of well-established state laws regulating
internal party matters, it would appear that state party structure, and
much of their internal operations, are firmly under state regulatory
control. There was limited federal judicial activity touching internal
party matters for the first half of the twentieth century.39 Howev-
er, in the mid-1960s courts began to apply the First Amendment
freedom of association to political parties and their members.4° It
for equal representation of sexes).
14 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 7160 (providing guidelines for the election
of members to the state central committee); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 2-106(2)
(McKinney 1998) (requiring that members of state committees be elected
biennially).
" See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7198, 7241 (providing parliamentary
procedure); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.121 (West 1998) (providing powers and
duties of executive committees); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 2-112, 2-114 (McKinney
1998) (providing committee rules).
36 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7156-7169 (West 1996) (providing for
committee appointments and elections); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.131, 103.141,
103.151 (West 1998) (providing for removal of committee members); N.Y. ELEC.
LAW §§ 2-116, 2-118 (McKinney 1998) (providing for committee member
removal and filling of vacancies).
" See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6000-6954 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.101 (West 1998) (providing presidential preference primary procedures);
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-122 (McKinney 1998) (providing procedure for election of
delegates to the national party convention).
31 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.121 (West 1998) (providing committee
members with the power to raise and expend party funds); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-
126 (McKinney 1998) (providing restrictions on expenditures of party funds).
'9 Most cases during this period that concerned parties dealt with race
discrimination by parties. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
'4 One of the earliest cases to grapple with the public-private entity problem
in the area of internal party functions was Bentman v. Seventh Ward Democratic
Executive Committee which held, inter alia, that judicial intervention in internal
party affairs "must be limited to controversies" that bear a "[d]irect and
[s]ubstantial relationship" to the party's "[plublic functions." 218 A.2d 261, 266
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was at this time that at least some federal judges began to note the
distinction between party elections that elected representatives to
government positions and those that elected individuals to run the
party itself.41 This distinction is important in that it implicitly
recognized that some party elections are of greater public concern
than others. While this distinction has not been elaborated on by
the courts, it is important to our efforts to assign varying standards
of review to different party functions. By 1968 the Supreme Court
had stated unequivocally that the First Amendment freedom of
association extended to political parties.
In succeeding years, a few federal decisions showed a height-
ened willingness to employ free association principles to strike
state efforts to regulate the internal functions of political parties.
One of the most thorough discussions came from the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in the 1974 decision of Redfearn v.
Delaware Republican State Committee, in which voters challenged
a party's electoral scheme for choosing delegates to the state party
convention that weighed some districts disproportionally.43 While
conceding that the party's state convention implicated "state action"
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court refused to strike the
party's "internal rules," as this would have been an intrusion on the
party's right of free association.' A few other courts at that time
also recognized the existence of a zone of private party conduct
where state regulations and judicial power should not ordinarily
interfere.45
(Pa. 1966).
41 See, e.g., Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 372 (3d Cir. 1965)
(recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause protects citizens in their choice of
"elected representatives in the conduct of government, not in the internal
management of a political party").
42 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
4' 502 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1974).
44 Id. at 1127-28.
45 McMenamin v. Philadelphia County Democratic Executive Comm., 405
F. Supp. 998, 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (refusing involvement in an internal party
dispute over selection of a ward leader absent any racial, geographic or
fraudulent aspect); Fahey v. Darigan, 405 F. Supp. 1386, 1394-95 (D. R.I. 1975)
(striking a state law seeking to regulate the selection and size of local party ward
committees as a violation of First Amendment free association right); Fox v.
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In 1979, the Supreme Court entered this debate with its
landmark decision in Marchioro v. Chaney.46 This case involved
a challenge to a state law requiring each of the state's major
political parties to maintain state committees composed of two
persons from each county. The Court found that these restrictions
on the parties did not violate the parties' First Amendment freedom
of association because the "purely internal party activities"
undertaken by these committees were duties delegated to it by the
party's own state convention rather than mandated by the chal-
lenged statute.47 However, in reaching this decision, the Supreme
Court apparently adopted the appellants' list of what constituted
party activities.48 More importantly, the Court recognized that
state regulation of party activities that relate to the electoral process
is different from and implicates a greater state interest than
regulation of party committees in the performance of their internal
tasks. 49 Subsequent decisions have also applied the Storer compel-
ling interest test to a variety of internal functions.5 °
Tucker, 320 A.2d 919 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (refusing to force party to comply
with its own affirmative action plan).
46 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
47 Id. at 197.
41 Id. at 193, 197-98.
49 Activities that were recognized as relating to the electoral process
included: filling of vacancies on the party ticket, providing for the nomination
of presidential electors, and the calling of statewide conventions. Party activities
deemed "internal" included: party policy-making, directing the party administra-
tive apparatus, raising and distributing funds to party candidates, conducting
workshops on campaign procedures and organization, and influencing public
policy and public officials. Id.
50 See, e.g., Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
a Michigan law granting state legislators ex officio delegate status at party's
national convention a violation of the state party's First Amendment right of free
association); Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, 898 F.2d 1192,
1193 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming that the refusal of party chair to allow newly-
elected precinct leaders to participate in election of ward chairmen did not
involve state action); Fahey, 405 F. Supp. at 1396 (D.R.I. 1975) (striking a state
law attempting to increase the size of city ward committees as not furthering a
compelling state interest); Louisiana Republican Party v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 225,
226 (La. 1996) (holding that a state law providing a method for electing
members to party's state central committee violated free association rights); Gosz
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A major watershed in this area came in the mid-1980s in
extended litigation involving challenges to California's elaborate
election code. 5' The opinions generated by this case provide one
of the most thorough discussions of the public-private entity
problem of placing American political parties under the First
Amendment. The litigation culminated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee,52 in which the Court struck California's election laws
as unconstitutional burdens on that state's political parties and their
members' First Amendment rights without serving a compelling
state interest. 53 In a strongly-worded opinion, the Court in Eu
struck California's statutes regulating the organization and
composition of the party's governing bodies, limitations on the
terms of office for state central committee chairs, and the require-
ment that these chairs rotate between regions of the state.54
Building on its recent decision in Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut, which struck a Connecticut law mandating that parties
could hold only closed primary elections,5 5 the Court in Eu noted
that even stronger associational rights were at stake because
California had tried to regulate the ability of party members to
associate among themselves instead of with nonparty members.56
The Court also distinguished Eu on the basis that the statute
regulated party leaders, and therefore did not directly implicate
strong state interests in the electoral process.57 The Court found
that the state had no compelling interest in regulating the democrat-
ic management of the parties' internal affairs. In fact, the Court
found that such state regulation could actually hamper the parties
in the conduct of their external responsibilities to ensure orderly
v. Quattrocchi, 448 A.2d 135, 140 (R.I. 1982) (upholding state law modifying
the process for filling the state's 100 party committee districts because
reapportionment was found to be a compelling interest).
51 San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 792 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1986), affd, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
52 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
" Id. at 233.
54 id.
55 479 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1986).
56 489 U.S. at 230-31.
17 Id. at 231-32.
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and fair elections.58 The Eu decision did not result in wholesale
attacks on existing state laws regulating political parties and most
state regulatory schemes remain in effect.59
This review of the case law relating to state regulation of
internal party matters shows that the federal courts are still
developing standards to deal with these situations. The Eu decision
was a major contribution in the effort to clarify these standards by
identifying some specific party functions as sufficiently "internal"
to warrant application of the compelling state interest test. This
decision comports well with my trichotomous model by moving
towards a doctrine whereby specific party operations are recognized
as vital to the maintenance of vigorous political parties and are
therefore beyond state regulation absent a demonstration of
compelling state interest.
B. State Laws versus National Party Rules
A fairly distinct line of cases has considered the problems that
arise when state legislation comes into conflict with the national
party rules. In some ways, this line of cases is similar to those
previously discussed: it involves state efforts to regulate an
"internal" operation of the parties. However, in these cases the
regulation affects the relationship between the state's parties and
their national party organizations.6 °
The issue of state regulations conflicting with national party
rules has arisen almost exclusively in the context of delegate
selection at the state level for national party conventions. The first
major case in this area was the 1972 decision of O'Brien v. Brown,
where the Supreme Court refused to settle a dispute involving
Illinois delegates to the National Democratic Convention.61 The
58 Id. at 232.
'9 See Louisiana Republican Party v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 225, 228-29 (La.
1996) (striking amendments to a state statute that provided a method for electing
members to the state's central committees).
60 Whether strictly "internal" or not, these cases have for years been
regarded as raising First Amendment free association issues. See Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975).
61 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam).
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Court essentially avoided ruling in this case by pointing to the fact
that the Convention would be meeting in only days and that the
delegate dispute could be settled there. Five Justices in O'Brien
indicated that this was something of a political matter that the
courts had traditionally avoided.62 The Court squarely faced this
issue three years later in Cousins v. Wigoda, in which it decided
that national party rules prevail over contrary state laws.63 In
Cousins, the Court was not convinced that state regulation of the
delegate selection process implicated compelling state interests. 64
Instead, the Justices stressed the importance of free association for
political parties.65
The Cousins decision appeared to settle this question for some
years.66 Occasionally, however, a federal judge questioned
whether Cousins meant that any national party rules necessarily
prevail over state law.67 The most recent federal decisions in this
area have struck state laws attempting to regulate selection of party
delegates to national conventions unless there is a clear conflict
with national party rules.68
62 Id. at 4-5.
63 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
64 Id. at 489-91.
65 Id. at 478-88.
66 See, e.g., Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26 (1981) (upholding power of a national party to
refuse to seat delegates chosen under the state law of which the party disap-
proved); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that national party's
delegate allocation formula need not conform strictly to Equal Protection require-
ments); Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683, 691, 697-99 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(holding that a state cannot control the selection of national party delegates
because a party primary is not an "election" under state law); Fallon v. State Bd.
of Elections of New York, 408 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding state
law regulating ballot preferences of delegates because national party rules
deferred to states on that matter); Totten v. State Bd. of Elections, 403 N.E.2d
225, 228-29 (Ill. 1980) (recognizing that parties have certain rights of free
association though these may be limited by state law).
67 See, e.g., Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 1978);
Fallon, 408 F. Supp. at 638 n.3.
68 Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (2d Cir. 1995); Heitmanis
v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Given the Court's decision in Cousins, this comer of state
regulation of political parties appears to be fairly well-settled.
While recognizing the existence of some state interests in these
situations, the federal courts have come down almost uniformly on
the side of the national party rules. Part of the courts' rationale in
these cases stems from a deference to the national party organiza-
tions or at least a sense that individual states should not hamper the
national party organizations. My trichotomous scheme makes no
distinction between the "internal" concerns of state parties as
opposed to their national brethren. On a theoretical basis, it seems
that the desire to preserve the private side of state and local party
activity should be sufficient, in itself, to keep state regulation out
of the delegate selection process. However, as the previous section
showed, the states have regularly been more successful at securing
judicial sanction to regulate internal matters of their own state party
organizations.
C. State Laws Regulating Party Endorsements
States have long regulated the ability of their state party
committees to give public endorsements to candidates running in
the parties' primary elections.69 This topic closely touches the
internal decision-making process of political parties in what is
arguably their most important function: the nomination of candi-
dates for public office. While it could easily be argued that primary
endorsements by parties implicate the electoral process, and thus
important state interests, this Article will treat the matter as one
internal to political parties.7°
69 Party endorsements are either indicated on the primary ballot, most
commonly by location of the candidate's name, or are expressed "off-ballot" by
party officials. Some states have tried to ban primary endorsements outright
while others have sought to limit when and how party committees may render
their endorsements.
70 Most courts seem to agree that this is largely an internal party matter. See,
e.g., Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Fahey v.
Darigan, 405 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (D.R.I. 1975); Gosz v. Quattrocchi, 448 A.2d
135, 137 (R.I. 1982).
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These cases usually raise issues of free speech and equal
protection as well as free association. The free speech claims arise
from situations where a state tries to limit sharply or bar entirely
endorsements by party officials or committees. Some courts have
construed these as prior restraints and thus usually strike them as
unconstitutional. 7' The Equal Protection issue is less clear. Most
courts appear to treat the endorsement process as a private party
matter that does not implicate the "state action" required for
application of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.
7 2
Only a few cases, beginning in the mid-1960s, have dealt
directly with primary endorsements by parties. Most of these cases
have upheld the ability of political parties to render such endorse-
ments, often on the basis that this party activity is not an integral
part of the election scheme.73 At least one other court has rejected
state efforts to regulate primary endorsements as unconstitutional
prior restraints on First Amendment free expression.74 In those
few instances where such state laws have been upheld, court have
usually required a showing of compelling state interest.
75
The most extended and definitive discussion of this issue came
from the Supreme Court in its 1989 landmark decision in Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.76 The Eu Court
struck California's ban on party endorsements as violative of free
speech because it inhibited the ability of parties to communicate
recommendations to their members as to which candidates best
represented the parties' ideology.77 Applying strict scrutiny to the
California law, the Court found that the asserted state interests of
"party stability" and prevention of "voter confusion" were not
"' See, e.g., Abrams, 452 F. Supp. at 1170.
72 See, e.g., Gosz, 448 A.2d at 137-38; Gallant v. LaFrance, 222 A.2d 567,
570 (R.I. 1966).
73 Fahey, 405 F. Supp. at 1391; Gallant, 222 A.2d at 570.
7' Abrams, 452 F. Supp. at 1171-72.
71 See, e.g., Gosz, 448 A.2d at 137-38 (holding that the strict scrutiny
standard should be applied to the legislative modification of existing district
committees, and this legislative intrusion was justified by a compelling state
interest-the reapportionment of the General Assembly).
76 498 U.S. 214, 222-29 (1989).
77 id. at 223.
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sufficiently compelling to justify their burden on free associa-
tion.78 In fact, the Court concluded that a party primary was an
"ideal forum" for the resolution of intra-party disputes.79
As the reviewed case law indicates, the courts have made some
progress in establishing general guidelines for the most commonly
occurring fact situations in this area. But an explicit linking of
these isolated lines of cases to one another under a common
rationale is necessary. This can be done by grouping these
decisions together under the rubric of their common element,
namely the implication of the party's internal structure or decision-
making processes.
Under my tripartite model, this area of party life should be
accorded the greatest leeway by the states. The courts should
bolster and preserve this party independence through application of
the most demanding constitutional hurdles. Most case law touching
on internal party structure, regulation of party delegate selection,
or primary endorsements has favored party independence by
upholding its First Amendment rights. This judicial tendency needs
to be reiterated more firmly and state regulation of parties steered
to other aspects of party behavior. The courts must identify the
regulation of internal party matters as a class that raises important
First Amendment rights and triggers rigorous constitutional
standards such as the compelling interest test.
V. ADJUDICATION OF THE ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES OF PARTIES
This Part will review and extrapolate from those federal court
decisions that have adjudicated party activities relating to the
electoral process. State regulatory efforts in this area are distinct
from those discussed in the preceding section that attempted to
regulate the internal activities of parties. The admixture of state and
party interests in this second set of cases is qualitatively different
from the first and more complex. The interests of the state in
regulating parties' (public) electoral activities are much greater than
in the regulation of their internal (private) operations. The courts
78 Id. at 227-28.
" Id. at 227 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)).
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have recognized important, sometimes even compelling, state
interests in regulating election-related functions of their parties.
Some of the state interests asserted over the years have included
integrity of the electoral process,8 ° maintenance of the two-party
system,8 avoidance of voter confusion," prevention of intra-
party friction," maintenance of political stability,84 and preserva-
tion of the fair ballot access for candidates and political parties."
In the substantial body of case law on this topic, the courts
have struggled to balance these state interests in the administration
of the electoral process with the First Amendment rights of
political parties and their members. 86 It is now well-established
that state regulation of elections can impinge First Amendment
rights of free association.87 However, the precise extent to which
states may regulate parties' electoral activities without violating
these rights remains particularly vague.
80 See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1973) (recognizing that
a state may have a legitimate interest in curtailing raiding-the "practice whereby
voters in sympathy with one party vote in another's primary in order to distort
that primary's results").
81 See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 222-25
(1986).
82 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 226 (1989); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220-22; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 796 (1983); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
83 See, e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 227-28; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224; Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124
(1981).
84 See, e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 226; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
85 See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 733; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145.
86 Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 57 (1973) (recognizing that "in exercising their [States] powers of
supervision over elections and in setting qualifications for voters, the States may
not infringe upon basic constitutional protections"); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 135;
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972); Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Of course, the
Constitution entrusts most of the administration of the electoral process to the
states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, art. II, § 1. See also Kusper, 414 U.S. at 57.
87 Kusper, 414 U.S. at 57 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968)).
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In recent years, courts have struck down a wide range of state
laws regulating electoral matters because of the burden they placed
on parties' First Amendment rights. Some of the situations where
state laws have been struck include statutes requiring that parties
hold only closed primaries,88 barring voters from participating in
a primary if they had voted in another party's primary in the
preceding 23 months,89 requiring new parties to gather 25,000
signatures to get on the ballot,90 and requiring parties to hold and
fund primary elections.91 However, the courts have upheld many
electoral regulations as well, including laws requiring a one-year
non-affiliation requirement for candidates intending to run as
independents,9  specifying ballot access requirements,93  and
specifying voter qualifications. 94
The courts have tended to focus narrowly on the facts of each
case in this area without much success in creating workable
standards for this class of litigation. Given the great variety of
circumstances in which election laws can affect the associational
rights of parties, it is not surprising that the courts have not been
able to develop more satisfying standards. In most cases it is
simply a matter of the degree of infringement on First Amendment
rights. The Supreme Court has struck those state laws that present
a "significant encroachment" on associational rights,95 or when the
legislation "unnecessarily burden[s] or restrict[s] [a] constitutionally
protected liberty."96 But there is little more in the way of judicial
guidance here.
88 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 208.
89 Kusper, 414 U.S. at 68-69.
90 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 295-96 (1992).
91 Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir.
1995).
92 See, e.g., Colorado Libertarian Party v. Secretary of State, 817 P.2d 998
(Colo. 1991).
9' McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir.
1995).
9' See, e.g., Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976).
9' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973) (citing Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462 (1958).




As many states have expanded their regulation of the electoral
process, the question of balancing these laws with the First
Amendment rights of parties has become more pressing. While
party claims to independence and privacy are on weaker founda-
tions, my trichotomous formula calls for some balancing of the
public and private interests even here. At a minimum, the courts
should establish more precise guidelines to preserve a balance
among the competing interests in this area of the law.
The remainder of this section draws several distinctions that
will help establish a bright line boundary between the interests of
the states and the political parties in electoral activities. These
refinements should help both courts and state legislatures more
easily identify where state interests end and party rights begin.
This, in turn, should help preserve the delicate balance in this area.
These distinctions grow out of existing case law, but have never
been made explicit nor linked to one another in a coherent scheme
to balance the competing political interests.
The first of these distinctions draws upon the existence of two
electoral phases in most American elections: the primary (party)
elections and the general election. A second and related recommen-
dation concerns the much-litigated issue of ballot access. Finally,
court opinions construing the rights of third or minor political
parties will be drawn upon for further lessons.
A. General Elections versus Primary Elections
One of the most obvious places to draw a relatively clear line
in state regulation of party behavior is between the primary election
and general election phases. Although both are parts of the larger
selection process, the primary phase can certainly be seen as
implicating greater party interests of association and free speech
than the general election process, since it is essentially an intra-
party affair. Under my trichotomous formula set forth above, it
would be expected that state regulation of primary elections would
have to pass a slightly higher judicial standard than state regulation
of general elections.
Surprisingly, few federal courts have made much of the
distinction between primary and general elections, or given much
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consideration to developing separate standards for each phase.97
One reason for this may be that most electoral disputes involve
only one phase or the other, eliminating the need to compare
standards between the two stages. Another reason may simply be
the early history of federal adjudication of party primaries. Most of
these early cases were aimed at striking racially exclusive practices
in some party primaries.98 These decisions have tended to empha-
size the view that primaries were simply part of the larger electoral
process and thus subject to state regulation and federal constitution-
al standards. Substantial case law exists to support the position that
the two electoral phases be treated similarly on the belief that both
implicate state action.99 -
Most judges have tended to recognize the traditional state
interests raised in cases regulating the electoral process without
regard to whether a primary or general election was involved. °°
One of the rare exceptions came in the 1983 Supreme Court
decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze,'0 1 where the Court struck
down Ohio's early filing deadline as a violation of the voting and
associational rights of supporters of an independent presidential
candidate. For the majority, Justice Stevens made reference to the
existence of a different set of state interests necessary to justify
regulation of party primaries as opposed to general elections.
10 2
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist charged that the majority was making
this distinction simply to avoid certain precedents. 0 3 Whatever
9 Originally, the Supreme Court refused to consider the primary phase as
a part of the electoral process. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250
(1921).
98 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1952); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944).
9 See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 374-75 (1963); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316-19 (1941);
Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 842.
"o See, e.g., American Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092,
1097 (10th Cir. 1997).
101 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
102 Id. at 788 n.9, 802 n.29.
103 Id. at 817-18 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). In particular, Justice Rehnquist
referred to the Court's decision in Storer v. Brown, which upheld a state law
imposing an even earlier filing deadline than at issue in Anderson, finding that
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the motivation, this minor dispute is one of the rare instances in
which some members of the Supreme Court recognized a distinc-
tion in the constitutional treatment that should be accorded primary
and general election stages.
However, the sharpest Supreme Court discussion of the
possibility that the nomination process should be treated differently
arose in the context of the applicability of the Voting Rights Act
of 19651° to party nominating conventions. In its 1996 decision
in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,10 5 a bare majority ruled
that the preclearance provision in section 5 of the 1965 Act1°6
applied to an effort by a state party to charge a "registration fee"
for participation in its nominating convention. In three dissenting
opinions,107 the conservative wing of the Court argued that parties
are not "political subdivisions" of the state to which section 5
preclearance applies.1"8 The Court continued by saying that the
parties are not "state actors,"1 °9 a primary registration fee is not
"voting" for section 5 preclearance purposes," ° and that a blanket
application of section 5 preclearance to nominating processes
would force the parties to preclear all of their internal proce-
dures.' In a concurrence by Justice Breyer,"' three members
of the Court's majority in Morse believed that section 5 preclear-
ance was only applicable to "certain activities of political parties,
such as nominating activities." ' 3 Despite the ruling in Morse, it
it was supported by a compelling state interest in political "stability." 415 U.S.
724, 736 (1974).
'04 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973-1975 (1994)).
105 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
'06 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
107 517 U.S. 186, 241-47 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 247-52
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 253-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'o' Id. at 252-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'09 Id. at 248-51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 276-80 -(Thomas, J., dissenting).
. Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 id. at 235-45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 238 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer lists a number of party
activities that appear to lie beyond section 5 preclearance: adoption of party
resolutions and platforms; rules governing internal party operations; changes in
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does appear from the five opinions in that case that at least seven
members of the present court continue to have serious reservations
regarding the encroachment of federal regulations on party activity
in light of the important First Amendment rights involved."'
An explicit distinction should be drawn and maintained between
the two phases of the election cycle. Such a distinction grows
easily from the trichotomous model set forth earlier and would
establish a sharper delimitation of both party independence and
government regulatory interests. This would help stabilize the First
Amendment rights of parties and their members while preserving
a major role for government regulation to prevent party abuse of
their electoral responsibilities.
The distinction between the nomination and general election
phases could be strengthened if the Court required a somewhat
higher standard than that applied to state laws that regulate the
nomination process. Unless racial discrimination was alleged, the
burden of proof should fall initially on the government in those
cases where it seeks to regulate parties in carrying out their
nominating function. State legislation regulating party primaries or
conventions would thus have to be supported by a showing of a
"substantial state interest." In contrast, state regulation of the
general election phase would be presumed constitutional, with the
burden of proof falling on the challengers to show an "arbitrary
and capricious" government action.
This proposed tightening of the standards would enhance the
distinction between these two electoral phases, one essentially an
intra-party affair, the other a public, inter-party dispute. This
approach has the advantage of being theoretically justifiable in that
it helps balance the competing political values in this area of the
law. It would also be workable in practice in that it is based on two
relatively identifiable and distinct processes. This would also likely
produce more uniform and predictable court decisions in this field.
In fact, there is probably no easier place to identify where
recruitment of party members; and conduct of political campaigns. See also
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1992).
... The seven are Chief Justices Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.
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individual rights of First Amendment association end and govern-
ment or public interests in a fair and open political system begin.
The current state of the case law is simply too uncertain-in
large part because of the courts' unwillingness to clearly separate
the two electoral phases from one another. Recent case law seldom
makes an explicit distinction between the two stages, inviting
continued growth of state regulatory power with no clear stopping
point. Given the special problems and history of racial exclusion in
partisan affairs, it will probably prove necessary to continue to
permit greater government supervision of even the primary phase
when racial discrimination is alleged. To this end, the Morse
decision extending section 5 preclearance to certain party nominat-
ing actions might prove wise. However, in those cases not
involving race, a return to the pre-1940s position that primaries and
general elections be treated differently would enhance predictability
and further a balance between the competing values.
B. State Laws Regulating Ballot Access for Third Parties
Most states have a statutory scheme that regulates their
electoral processes by controlling access to their election ballot.
These statutes typically include various requirements that parties or
candidates must fulfill in order to secure a place on an election
ballot. Some of the most common of these are filing fees, 5
disaffiliation requirements for independent candidates," 6 signa-
ture requirements," 7 and minimal prior electoral support." 8 The
enacting state typically justifies such regulations on grounds of
protecting the "integrity" of the party system," 9 fostering the
15 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8103 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 99.061 (West Supp. 1998).
116 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8301 (West 1996).
17 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8400 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 99.0955, 99.096 (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-136, 6-142
(McKinney 1998).
18 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5100 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 99.0955(2) (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney 1998).
9 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974) (citing Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786
(1974); Thoumir v. Meyer, 909 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir. 1990).
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efficient processing of petitions, 2 ' preventing "laundry lists" of
candidates,' minimizing voter confusion,'22 discouraging friv-
olous candidates who are not serious,'23 and promoting fair,
honest and orderly elections.'24
These state regulatory efforts tend to fall disproportionately on
"minor" or third political parties, and on independent candi-
dates. 25 But these state electoral schemes also affect the major
parties indirectly in that they structure the competitiveness of the
electoral terrain. Ballot access legislation often determines the
number and strength of competing parties and independent
candidates in a state's political life. Constitutional challenges to
such state laws have proven somewhat revealing of judicial
attitudes on the relative importance of party independence and the
need for state regulation of parties.
There is a substantial body of federal case law dealing with
state efforts to control access to election ballots. Generally, the
courts have judged these statutes by assessing whether they
impermissibly burden First Amendment rights of free speech or
association, or whether they violate the Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating against minor parties. 126 It appears settled that the
right of candidates to participate in primaries is not fundamental
120 See Tarpley v. Salerno, 803 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
121 Variously referred to as causing fragmentation of the ballot or "ballot
flooding." See Thournir v. Meyer, 708 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Colo. 1989), affid, 909
F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1990); Consumer Party v. Davis, 633 F. Supp. 877, 887
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
122 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 712 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 144-45 (1972).
123 See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 735.
124 See Libertarian Party of Okla. v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 593 F.
Supp. 118, 121 (D. Okla. 1984).
125 See Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley, On the Treatment of Political
Parties in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1900-1986, 52 J. OF POLS. 413-32 (1990);
Bradley Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need
Not Apply, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 167-217 (1991). Often, the two major
parties enjoy a statutorily privileged position on state ballots. In some states,
several parties are given a privileged ballot position by statute. See, e.g., CAL.
ELEC. CODE §§ 7050-7881 (West 1996).
126 See, e.g., Consumer Party, 633 F. Supp. at 885.
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like the right to vote.12 7 An occasional judge has called for the
creation of an "exception" for third parties which would make it
easier for them to challenge state ballot access laws. 2 8 However,
the Supreme Court in the landmark Buckley v. Valet decision was
unwilling to create a "blanket exemption" for third political parties,
although the Court indicated that greater flexibility should be
accorded third parties seeking to prove injury from state ballot
regulations. 129
Over the years, the courts have resorted to a variety of review
standards for judging state ballot access regulations. 130 The
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze set forth
a "balancing test" that runs from strict scrutiny to rational basis
analysis.13' Under the Anderson test, strict scrutiny is applied
only if it is first determined that protected rights are "severely bur-
dened;" otherwise the magnitude of the burden on the minor party
is balanced against the asserted interests of the state. 132 Subse-
quent handling by courts of ballot access disputes have tried to
127 American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974); Bullock, 405
U.S. at 142-43; Thournir v. Meyer, 909 F.2d 408, 412 (10th Cir. 1990); City of
Akron v. Beil, 660 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1981).
128 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 907-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
129 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
130 Compare, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173 (1979) (applying strict scrutiny); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
(1974) (same); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (same), with Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (favoring rational relationship test), and with
American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (applying a mix of strict
and minimal scrutiny). See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965-66 (1982)
(limiting strict scrutiny to ballot access laws based on wealth). See also
Consumer Party, 633 F. Supp. at 885 n.9; Colorado Libertarian Party v.
Secretary of State, 817 P.2d 998, 1001-02 (Colo. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 7,
§ 13-20.
131 460 U.S. 780, 787-90 (1983). This test is applicable to both First
Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to ballot access legislation.
132 Id. at 789. The Supreme Court has since restated this strict scrutiny test.
See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986).
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apply this test and to answer when each part of this test is
applicable. 133 In so doing, federal courts have identified a variety
of state laws that "severely burden" First Amendment rights and
thus have subjected them to strict scrutiny. 134 Other state laws
have been found to impose only "reasonable, non-discriminatory"
burdens on First Amendment rights and thus need only be
supported by important regulatory interests of the state., 35 The
two most recent Supreme Court cases on ballot access have
restated the two-tier Anderson test for judging state ballot access
laws. 136
State regulation of parties' electoral behavior generally falls
within the middle tier of my three-way division where the interests
of the parties and those of the state are both substantial. This
situation appears to indicate that some form of balancing test would
be most appropriate. However, state ballot access laws are
somewhat unusual in that they typically fall most heavily on third
113 See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432-440; Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,
288-90 (1992); McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215,
1221 (4th Cir. 1995); Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1542-44 (11th Cir.
1992); Colorado Libertarian Party, 817 P.2d at 1001-02.
'34 See, e.g., Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-90 (finding state law requiring new
party to gather 25,000 signatures violative of the First Amendment under a strict
scrutiny analysis); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 95-98 (1982) (declaring California statute requiring independent candidates
to be politically disaffiliated for one year prior to primary election constitutional
because it reflected a compelling state interest protecting the electoral process);
Workers World Party v. Vigil-Giron, 693 F. Supp. 989, 994-97 (D.N.M. 1988)
(holding state law requiring party membership of all signatories to party ballot
access petition violative of First Amendment).
... See, e.g., McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1221-26 (upholding state law requiring
petitions with 2% of voters' signatures for a party to secure ballot access after
balancing state and party interests); Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 868-69 (9th
Cir. 1992) (upholding state law requiring parties to nominate candidates by direct
primary and to show support before appearing on general election ballot applying
strict scrutiny); Libertarian Party of Fla. v. Smith, 687 So. 2d 1292, 1295 (Fla.
1996) (upholding a statutory ban on fee rebates for minor parties because it
furthered state interests by preventing factionalism and discouraging third
parties); Colorado Libertarian Party, 817 P.2d at 1001-05 (holding that state's
12-month unaffiliation requirement did not violate third party's rights of free
association).
136 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34; Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-90.
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political parties. This situation might be solved by applying the
balancing portion of the Anderson test to ballot access laws which
do not fall disproportionately on third parties, while reserving strict
scrutiny analysis for regulations that disadvantage third parties.
This would allow the courts to continue to balance state interests
and party First Amendment rights, but to hold discriminatory
regulations to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, the choice of the proper constitutional test should turn on
whether the case involved First Amendment rights or equal
protection concerns, rather than on whether the regulation "severely
burdened" ballot access as in Anderson and its progeny.
This approach would not only produce clearer application of
constitutional standards, but would also preserve a more appropriate
balance between state and party interests. An additional benefit
would be to accord greater protection to third parties in our system.
A number of federal courts have recognized the significance that
third parties play in our democracy.137 Adoption of my standard
would further this political ideal. Though the two major parties
deserve some protection from excessive electoral regulations, their
claim is not nearly as compelling as that of minor political parties.
VI. ADJUDICATION OF PARTY ACTIONS IN GOVERNMENT
Although American parties are seldom seen as "entering"
government in the same sense as their European counterparts, their
elected officials usually continue to act as partisans once they are
in office. This final Part will review and extrapolate the judicial
application of constitutional standards to the actions of political
137 See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 92-93 (holding that Ohio's disclosure
requirements could not constitutionally be applied to the Socialist Workers Party,
a minor political party); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1979) (holding Illinois Election Code requiring new
political parties to obtain more than 25,000 signatures in Chicago unconsti-
tutional); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 907-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the
majority's conclusion that applying disclosure requirements to minor parties does
not violate the constitution), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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parties once they have won public office. The major area of
Supreme Court activity here has been in the adjudication of various
patronage activities of parties, particularly the efforts by
newly-elected officials to replace non-partisans with their fellow
partisans in appointed government positions. The other major area
of attention has been to those instances where parties, through their
elected members, engage in the partisan gerrymandering of
electoral districts.
In terms of my tripartite model, once a party has moved "into
government" it must necessarily surrender much of the private side
of its existence. Indeed, once the party-or its partisans-are in
power they are the government from which other parties need
protection. As part of the governmental apparatus, the incumbent
party no longer needs protection from government intervention.
Instead, it is other political parties and non-partisans who may need
judicial protection from the party in power. Therefore, in contrast
to the regulation of party internal organization or party behavior in
the electoral arena, party actions in government should receive the
least constitutional protection. Put in terms of my trichotomy, the
incumbent party officials represent almost none of the private side
of parties. Concurrently, the public interest in regulating partisan
activity is clearly great given the policy-making power of the
incumbent party through its partisans.138
A.. Partisan Gerrymandering
Comparatively few modern federal cases have dealt directly
with partisan gerrymandering by the party in power. Most cases
involving legislative gerrymandering by state legislatures have been
13 In terms of the constitutional rights, there is also an important distinction
between political parties based on whether they are in or out of power. In those
cases dealing with parties out of office, the constitutional focus has frequently
been on the rights of the party and its members to associate with whom they
please and to exclude those with whom they do not wish to associate for political
reasons. But, when dealing with parties in government, the courts have often
emphasized the individual rights of those government officials who choose not
to associate with the reigning party.
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based on racial motives rather than partisan ones. 139 The Supreme
Court has been increasingly intolerant of racial motivations in this
area and has erected stiff constitutional standards to deal with such
cases under the Equal Protection Clause.1 41 However, where party
politics rather than race is the motivation the courts have often
been reluctant to become involved.1 4 1
For years the Court refused to become directly involved in
cases of political or partisan gerrymandering as long as the districts
drawn were "equipopulous.' 42 For some time, the Court treated
this as another topic which was too "political" for adjudication. For
instance, in its 1973 decision in Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court
upheld a blatantly partisan gerrymander of Connecticut's legislative
districts, noting that "[p]olitics and political considerations are
inseparable from districting and apportionment.' 143
The major Supreme Court landmark in the area of political
gerrymandering since Gafffiey is the Court's 1986 decision in Davis
139 Major gerrymandering cases involving race, including those seeking to
create majority-minority electoral districts, include: United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507
U.S. 146 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
140 The most recent cases on the use of race to draw congressional district
lines are Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993). See also Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy
Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 541 (1994).
141 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1986) (holding that
partisan gerrymandering cases are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause
provided that a prima facie case is made by a strong representation of
discriminatory vote dilution).
142 John P. Ludington, Annotation, Constitutionality of State Legislative
Apportionment-Supreme Court Cases, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1496, 1514 (1985) (defining
"equipopulous gerrymandering" as "districting that satisfies the one person-one
vote requirement yet is discriminating toward an identifiable group of voters"
(citing Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerryman-
dering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation,
1996 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278)).
143 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
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v. Bandemer.1" In this case, the Court split badly and was able
to produce only a plurality decision. Nonetheless, six members of
the Court agreed that partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable
matter and not barred by the political question doctrine. 145 How-
ever, the Court. found that in order to succeed on an Equal
Protection claim, the plaintiff will have to prove both intentional
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group. 146 Furthermore, plaintiffs in
such cases are required to show that the alleged partisan gerryman-
der will consistently degrade their voters' (or group's) electoral
strength in the political process as a whole and that they will have
no hope of doing better in future elections. 147 Thus, though
justiciable, instances of political gerrymandering carry a very heavy
burden of proof.
Although the Bandemer case was based on an Equal Protection
analysis, it does offer some indication that at least three members
of the Court were concerned with preserving some degree of
independence for the party system in this area. For instance, in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence favoring judicial non-intervention
in cases of political gerrymandering, she stated:
Racial gerrymandering should remain justiciable, for the
harms it engenders run counter to the central thrust of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But no such justification can be
given for judicial intervention on behalf of mainstream
political parties, and the risks such intervention poses to our
political institutions are unacceptable. 'Political affiliation
is a keystone of the political trade. Race, ideally, is
not.' 1
4 8
Although in Bandemer, the Court did not address First
Amendment issues, these arguments have been dealt with by other
lower federal courts. The leading case is a 1988 California district
'4 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
145 Id. at 118-27.
146 Id. at 127.
147 Id. at 139, 141.
148 Id. at 160-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171 n.1 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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court opinion, Badham v. Eu.14 9 The Badham court dismissed a
political party's First Amendment challenge to California's
redistricting law, finding that the party was not precluded from
fielding candidates under the scheme. 5 ° The court unsympatheti-
cally noted that "[t]he First Amendment guarantees the right to
participate in the political process; it does not guarantee political
success."' 5 ' To succeed on such a First Amendment claim, a
party will have to show how the redistricting plan penalized their
exercise of First Amendment rights. A handful of other lower
federal courts have also dealt with partisan gerrymandering and
have followed the Bandemer precedent, whether basing their
decisions on the First Amendment or on the Equal Protection
Clause. 152
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area erect substantial
litigation barriers for plaintiffs seeking to challenge partisan
gerrymandering. These decisions appear to be based on the
practical difficulties inherent in proving such discrimination as well
as the Court's history of staying clear of these very political
disputes. However, my tripartite model dictates that the party in
power should receive little judicial protection on the basis of
preserving party integrity or independence. Thus, the burden
currently placed on plaintiffs in partisan gerrymandering cases
should be eased.
149 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 675.
152 See, e.g., LaPorte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Board of Comm'rs,
43 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that redistricting challenge did not state
a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause); Republican Party of N.C.
v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 732 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (dismissing Equal Protection
claim); Holloway v. Hechler, 817 F. Supp. 617, 628-29 (S.D. W. Va. 1992)
(dismissing First Amendment reapportionment challenge) (citing Republican
Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 404 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that
Equal Protection cause of action requires both intentional discrimination and
actual discriminatory effect; Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988))).
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B. Political Patronage
The other major incumbent party activity to come under
judicial scrutiny has been political patronage, including the hiring,
firing, and harassment of governmental employees on the basis of
their party affiliation. Political patronage is nearly as old as the
party system itself in the United States.1 53 In most cases, it is
more clearly a party activity than partisan gerrymandering. It may
also be more easily justified as a "necessary" party activity than
partisan gerrymandering.
The Supreme Court did not directly consider the constitutional-
ity of various patronage actions of political parties until Elrod v.
Burns in 1976.154 In that case, the Court found that the partisan
discharge of a county employee by a newly-elected local official
was an unconstitutional violation of First Amendment free
association. Four years later, the Court revisited the constitutional-
ity of various patronage activities in Branti v. Finkel and expanded
the class of public employees enjoying First Amendment protec-
tion. 55 And in 1990, the Court handed down its latest major
patronage decision, Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, which
restricted patronage activities through still further expansion of the
First Amendment free association rights of non-party government
workers. 56 Although these cases extended First Amendment
protection to public employees, they also acknowledged that there
exists a class of high-level public employees who are "policymake-
rs" with duties that make party affiliation and loyalty appropriate
"' Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 522 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN
TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 3-26 (1971).
"A 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
151 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
156 497 U.S. 62 (1990). Rutan extended the Elrod-Branti rule to adverse
patronage actions short of outright dismissal, including decisions as to promotion,
transfer, recall after layoff, and hiring of low-level public employees on party
affiliation and support. Id. at 69-79. See Robert C. Wigton, The Supreme Court
and Political Patronage: The Rutan Decision in Context, 2 GEO. MASON U. CIV.




employment considerations.157 Since this time, lower federal
courts have struggled to define which public employees are
"policymakers" deserving of less First Amendment protection.'58
Political patronage, like partisan gerrymandering, falls squarely
into the third tier of my tripartite model as an activity undertaken
by incumbent parties. Accordingly, the interests and rights of the
parties should be at their relative lowest ebb when undertaking
such patronage actions. The party in power is in need of little
protection from the "State" in order to preserve its independence.
Thus, cases presenting First Amendment claims against political
patronage actions should give maximum presumption to the First
Amendment claimant. In terms of constitutional law, the burden
should shift early to the party to demonstrate the reasons for
undertaking the challenged patronage actions.5 9
Current judicial doctrine requires that the government show a
compelling interest before subjecting "non-policymakers" to
partisan decisions. 16' This position comports well with my model
' Rutan, 497 U.S. at 71 n.5; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367; Branti, 445 U.S. at
517-18.
158 See, e.g., Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir.
1995); Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1994); Peters v.
Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1353-59 (3d Cir. 1994); Regan v.
Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577, 579-80 (2d Cir. 1993); Zold v. Township of Mantua,
935 F.2d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1991); Affrunti v. Zwim, 892 F. Supp. 451, 456-60
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). The determination as to which employees are "policymakers"
or "confidential" employees is based on the nature of the functions that employee
performs. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68; Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292,
1297 (3d Cir. 1993); Zold, 935 F.2d at 635. In particular, the courts have asked
whether the individual had meaningful input into decisionmaking over the nature
and scope of major government programs. See Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167,
169-70 (3d Cir. 1986); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981).
159 In these cases, the courts have typically required that the plaintiff-
employee carry the burden of proof that his or her First Amendment rights have
been infringed by the government employer on the basis of political affiliation.
However, the government body must carry the burden to demonstrate that the
employee falls within the "policymaking" exception. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518;
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368 (requiring the government to show an "overriding
interest" to secure the "policymaker" exception); Peters v. Delaware River Port
Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1353 (3d Cir. 1994).
160 See, e.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360.
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which calls for minimal protection for party activities undertaken
while they are "in government." However, the effort by the federal
judiciary to create an exception to this rule for high-level "policy-
makers" complicates the matter. The rationale for exempting this
class of employees appears to be to ensure loyalty among high-
level, policy-making government workers. 61 This is certainly an
important ideal in a democracy and may be sufficient reason to
curb this class of employees' protection from partisan actions.
However, it is significant that the majority of the Court in Rutan
expressly rejected various party-preservation reasons asserted by
the dissenters. 162 Thus the majority does not consider the excep-
tion to be something required to strengthen or maintain political
parties.
CONCLUSIONS AND SYNTHESIS
It would appear from this survey of major cases that the courts
have regularly drawn some distinctions between the private and
public sides of American political parties. However, these efforts
to delineate the two sides of political parties have usually been
piecemeal and divorced from the larger theoretical concerns in this
area. In the course of this Article, I have extrapolated from existing
case law in order to sharpen the applicable standards, while trying
to preserve a balance between the competing political values. I
have identified those areas where the interests in maintaining the
integrity and independence of political parties is greatest and
juxtaposed the more demanding constitutional standards for
adjudication of these state regulations.
16' Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74 ("A government's interest in securing employees
who will loyally implement its policies can be adequately served by choosing or
dismissing high-level employees on the basis of their political views.").
162 Id. at 74-75. Among the benefits of patronage cited by the Rutan
dissenters were promotion of stability in the political system, broadening the base
of political participation at the local level, facilitation of the integration of weak
societal groups into the political system, enhancement of party discipline and thus
responsive government, limitations on "political fragmentation," preservation of
the two-party system, and general strengthening of the parties. See id. at 104-08
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U.S. at 527-32 (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod,
427 U.S. at 379, 382-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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My efforts to establish clearer guidelines for application of
constitutional standards have been guided by the major fact
distinctions that have been made in these cases. In this way, I have
been able to compartmentalize certain fact scenarios and assign
each an appropriate standard of review based on the relative
interests of the regulating state and political party.
In Table One on page 453, I have attempted to merge the
judicial standards with each of the major activities undertaken by
modem American political parties. As this Table indicates, there
has been a sliding scale of judicial approaches to the adjudication
of party activities. The courts have seldom, if ever, attempted to
draw the lines clearly among party functions for purposes of
constitutional analysis. However, they have recognized that not all
party activities should be treated the same but should be judged by
varying standards depending on the nature of the activity itself. In
Table One, I have extrapolated from the Court's case law to date
in a effort to compose a more complete scheme for the balancing
of the competing interests in this area.
The sliding review scale set forth in this Table applies most
clearly to the two major political parties. When minor or third
parties are involved, the courts have often given a different
weighting to asserted state interests.
The table's top tier includes those party activities most
commonly seen as "private" or internal to parties. Those party
actions which are the most "private" in nature, and therefore which
arguably deserve the greatest protection from government, often
require that the state demonstrate a very high ("compelling")
interest to have its regulation upheld. This is usually further
reinforced by the imposition of the initial burden of proof on the
state when it attempts to regulate what we have deemed "internal"
party activities.
The party functions listed closer to the bottom of Table One
include those which are most generally regarded as more "public"
in nature. In adjudicating these matters, courts should place the
initial burden of proof on the political party so as to ease the
plaintiff's burden 'in challenging such party actions. In these
decisions, claims of party independence have usually been
insufficient to shield the party from judicial intervention.
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The electoral activities of parties occupying the middle rung of
Table One have been the most vexing for the courts. There is still
much that is unsettled in this area aside from those cases involving
the disenfranchisement of black voters. There is some case law that
supports the disparate treatment of the two phases of the electoral
process, giving the parties a bit more leeway in the conduct of
party primaries. Thus, I have split the two phases of the electoral
process here and offer slightly different tests for each.
This review of the case law shows that the Supreme Court has
been sensitive to the need to balance public regulation of parties
with the desire to preserve some degree of party independence.
This sensitivity has been reflected in the decisions of many judges,
but has resulted in an incomplete framework for reconciling the
competing interests. Nonetheless, the decisions in this area have
laid bare the major factors that the courts consider important for
balancing public regulation of parties with party independence. It
seems certain that additional line-drawing by the courts, particularly
with regard to the parties' purely electoral functions, will be
necessary to complete the analytical scheme in this area of
constitutional law.
POLITICAL PARTIES
Table 1: Summary of Judicial Review of Political Party Activities:
Resolving the Public-Private Entity Problem
Political Party Court's Review Standard and Burden
Function considerations of Proof
Internal Party A "compelling government interest" State
Activities 163  must be shown to justify regulation
of these party activities
Electoral National party rules vs. state Depends
Functions regulations; conduct of party in on the
campaign; whether discrimination form of
Nomination by party is "invidious"; 164 state discrimi-
Phase must show that its regulations are nation
not "invidious"
General Courts usually presume State Party
Election Phase Action for XIV Amendment Equal
Protection
Activities of the Court's primary concerns in these Party






161 "Internal party activities" refers to matters concerning the structure of
state and local party units, the composition of party committees, and internal
party financial matters. It also includes party rules regulating the selection of
state and local delegates to national conventions, but not those relating to
candidate access to the primary ballot.
64 "Invidious discrimination" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes has been
defined by the Court in a number of leading opinions. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886).
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